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apital no longer flows to countries where it is relatively scarce.
After the debt crisis erupted in 1982, the sudden reversal of
international capital transfers has led to the perverse situation
of capital exporting Third World economies. From the creditors'
point ofview it is tempting to argue that it is up to the borrowers to
restore their attractiveness for foreign capital through policy reform.
By contrast, borrowers argue that it is up to the creditors to remove
disincentives for internal adjustmentby granting debt reliefin the first
place. The discussion on which side should take the lead in breaking
through the vicious circle of underadjustment and underlending re-
sulted in a deadlock.
The time-tried saying "it takes two to tango" retains its validity
here. None of the parties involved can be expected to take its part
unless some idea exists about the behaviour of the other side:
- Borrowers are uncertain whether internal adjustment efforts will be
honoured by foreign creditors through relaxing the strict capital
rationing.
- Creditors are uncertainwhetherdebtconcessions will automatically
result in intensified adjustment efforts of the borrowers.
The decisions of both sides are closely intertwined so that uncer-
tainty is systemic [Blejer, Ize, 1989]. The objective ofthe research pro-
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ject on developing country debt by the National Bureau ofEconomic
Research to analyse the debt crisis from two perspectives, that ofthe
individual debtor country and the international financial system, is
thus weIl-taken. The outcome oftheproject, presented ata conference
in September 1987, includes eight papers, on debtcrises that occurred
before World War 11, on political factors that contribute to poor
economic policies in many debtor countries, on the role ofthe banks
and multilateral institutions during the current crisis, on the effect of
developed country economies on the debtors, and on possible solu-
tions to the debt problem (published together with an extensive intro-
duction by Jeffrey Sachs in the volume "Developing Country Debt
and Economic Performance: The International Financial System";
subsequently quoted as Vol. 1). The findings from case studies on
Argentina (Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo), Bolivia
(Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey Sachs), Brazil (Eliana Cardoso and
Albert Fishlow), Indonesia (Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution),
South Korea (Susan Collins and Won-Am Park), Mexico (Edward
Buffie, with the assistance ofAllen Sangines Krause), the Philippines
(Robert Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr.), and Turkey (Merih Celasun
and Dani Rodrik), as weIl as comments on the country studies by
Miguel Urrutia and Anne O. Krueger are published in the companion
volume "Developing Country Debt and the World Economy" (subse-
quently quoted as Vol. 2). This book additionallycontains the editor's
introduction and shorter and less technical summaries of the eight
papers on selected topics.
The country studies (Vol. 2) help to understand why some debtor
countries succumbed to a serious crisis while others did not. Fiscal
and trade policies are shown to be ofoverriding importance. More-
over, it is discussed why most of the problem debtors have been
unable to overcome the crisis. The reviewer does not share Urrutia's
view thatthe feeling of"dejävu" is nonexistent in reading the country
studies. Nonetheless, they provide valuable insights especially on the
politico-economic framework of internal decision making. Many of
the policy failures in the debtor countries are notmistakes in the sense
oftechnicalmisjudgements, butare the result ofdeeper political insta-
bilities. In Argentina, the "destructive pendulum between populists
and market-oriented reformists has meant that... the general atmo-
sphere is one of skepticism about everything Argentine" (Vol. 2,
p.37). The Bolivian experience reveals ample evidence on the state
being viewed as an instrument to satisfy the distributional agenda of
particular interest groups; politics degenerated into "fierce battles ofNunnenkamp: Developing Country Debt 793
the 'ins' versus the 'outs'" (Vol. 2, p. 65). A fundamental disjunction
between the pervasive role assigned to governments in the develop-
ment process and their weak capacity is also to be observed in many
African economies whose debt problems are not discussed within the
NBER project.
Particularly the political economy offiscal policy provides a key
to understanding the origins of debt problems and the measures re-
quired for overcoming them. The widespread battle over income
shares has stretched many Latin American governments far beyond
their fiscal capacity and seriously undermined their capacity to tax
income and wealth (e.g., land). In the era ofeasy foreign finance, the
typically large gap between government expenditures and revenues
was readily filled by bank loans. Unable or unwilling to raise taxes
and restrain consumptive spending, many governments resorted to
the inflation tax by printing money when foreign finance dried up.
This resulted in a vicious circle of monetary expansion and large
ad-hoc depreciations of the exchange rate which then fed into infla-
tion. With accelerated inflation, the tax base was further eroded since
the demand for real money balances fell and capital flight increased.
Public investment was squeezed so that the growth prospects deterio-
rated significantly. Atthe same time, "manywell-connected rent-seek-
ing individuals made considerable fortunes in the course ofthe hyper-
inflation" (Vol. 2, p. 73) in Bolivia and elsewhere.
In sharp contrast to the dismal experience ofmost Latin American
countries, external borrowing has not been used to avoid structural
readjustment in South Korea. This country study contains important
lessons on the merits of credibility, consistency and coherence in
economic policy, especially in maintaining a competitive real ex-
change rate (see also the study on Indonesia) together with a sustain-
able fiscal policy. Although "the public-sector budget remains the
Achilles' heel of the Turkish macroeconomy" (Vol. 2, p.209), this
country has shown that with a remarkable amount ofadjustment it is
weIl possible to overcome debt problems. So, one wonders why most
Latin American governments can do anything except applying
macroeconomically efficient fiscal, trade and exchange-rate policies.
The hypothesis raised by Urrutia that the implementation and en-
forcement ofincomeand land taxes is politically infeasible because the
power base ofmany regimes in Latin America is exclusively the mid-
dIe class ciearly deserves further research. The chances for sustainable
adjustment may be improved ifprograms were designed so that em-
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society were generated, thereby diversifying political support for the
government.
Adjustment problems in debtor countries figure also prominently
in the volume "Developing Country Debt and Economic Perfor-
mance: The International Financial System" (Vol. 1). Sebastian Ed-
wards shows that the immediate policy response to the debt crisis was
based on the perceived short-run "effectiveness" ofinstruments such
as capital controls and import quotas, rather than onefficiency. He is
skeptical, however, about whether rapid trade liberalization, coupled
with devaluation, privatization, and financial reform, is the most
reasonable strategy to achieve adjustment with growth. Edwards ar-
gues that possible trade-offs inherent in the "orthodox" approach
require a detailed discussion on the timing and sequencing ofreforms;
e.g., trade liberalization with lower import tariffs renders it more
difficult to achieve fiscal consolidationunless othersources ofrevenue
have been found. In general, "it is not recommended to undertake
substantial trade reforms at the same time that a major anti-inflation-
ary program is underway" (Vol. 1, p. 201). Trade liberalization should
rather be a gradual and preannounced process, with the replacement
ofimportquotas by tariffs as a first importantstep towardsimproving
efficiency.
Similarly, Sachs concludes that simultaneous application ofstabi-
lization andwidespread liberalization is unlikely to be sustainable and
successful under highly inflationary conditions. His suggestion to
postpone structural reforms until "after macroeconomic balance has
been restored" (Vol. 1, p.281) is not undisputable. Interestingly
enough, the IMF has been harshly criticized for nearly exclusively
addressing short-term stabilization issues during the first phase of
debt renegotiations after 1982. A credible announcement that stabi-
lization will be supplemented by structural reform not too far in the
future appears crucially important. Otherwise positive supply re-
sponses from reallocating capital are hardly to be expected. While
unemployment may be created by a too fast trade liberalization with
downward real wage inflexibility, lingering reform efforts may under-
mine credibility and sustainability by allowing those groups nega-
tively affected by structural reform to organize and lobby against it.
Another important pointmade by Edwards on the credibility oftrade
reform is straightforward: Private agents are unlikely to respond pos-
itively unless inconsistencies between fiscal and exchange-rate policies
are avoided; the experience of Chile with an overvalued currency in
the early 1980s is very telling in this respect.Nunnenkamp: Developing Country Debt 795
A slower speed ofadjustment requires thatcreditors agree to limit
the debt-service payments due to them in the initial years. Sachs
forcefully argues pro debt relief in order to overcome the adjustment
disincentives resulting from a debt overhang and to enhance the likeli-
hood that debtor governments will adhere to IMF and World Bank
conditionality. The compliance ofdebtor countries with conditional-
ity has typically been rather weak because ofthe inherent limitations
in enforcing conditionality in sovereign lending. Sachs expects that a
better outcome can be achieved once IMF programs were based on
partial and explicit debt relief.
Similarly, Paul Krugman's model of defensive lending suggests
that debt reliefis not only in the interest ofdebtors, but also optimal
for creditors who thereby raise the expected value ofthe initial debt.
The question remains, however, why the incentive for defensive lend-
ing has not induced additional bank lending on a sufficient scale in
recent years. According to Krugman, "low bank lending was the
outcome ofa bargaining process in which, ...,creditors had very high
bargaining power compared with debtors. A shift in that bargaining
process will produce a different result" (Vol. 1, p. 328). This conclu-
sion somewhat contradicts the standard argument that sovereignty
provides a strong lever of international borrowers to press for debt
concessions. Moreover, the recent buildup ofarrears to banks [Insti-
tute ofInternational Finance, 1990], which is frequently considered as
an innovative bargaining chip that may turn the tide, did not revive
bank financing up to now.
Both Sachs and Krugman hardly consider that under conditions
ofsystemic uncertainty it is not very promising for private creditors
to remove the present debt overhang by ex-ante debt relief, which is
in fact unconditional ifonly based on letters ofintent. Because ofthe
institutional peculiarities of sovereign lending, borrowers may rede-
fine their bargaining position and ask for more relief, rather than
implement adjustment measures, as soon as the creditors indicate that
they are willing to forgive some debt. Sovereign risk and moral hazard
by third countries can be reduced by an adequate timing ofdebt relief,
Le., when concessions are made only after internal adjustment by the
beneficiaries has taken place. In arecentpaper, it has been shown that
replacing ex-ante relief by ex-post concessions for reform-minded
borrowers provides strongadjustmentincentives for borrowers suffer-
ing from a debt overhang [Nunnenkamp, Stüven, 1990]. An adequate
ex-post relief scheme mayaIso reduce the uncertainty of borrowers
whether adjustment efforts will be honoured. This can be achieved by796 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
a credible commitment ofthe creditors that new capital transfers are
made available once credit-constrained borrowers have implemented
adjustment measures.
Another possible obstacle to a mutually agreed solution of the
debt overhang problem deserves closer attention, i.e., the strong in-
volvement of the IMF and the World Bank in international transfer
negotiations. Arguments in favour ofthe older bond-era direct con-
frontation between problem debtors and their creditors are discussed
by Peter Lindert and Peter Morton. They analyse how lending waves
unfold and what can be done once a crisis is in fuH swing by referring
to sovereign debt repayment since the early 19th century. It may
reasonably be concluded that "the more recent approach ofbringing
the IMF and the World Bank into tripartite debt-crisis negotiations
has brought extra costs relating to moral hazard, delays, and macro-
economic adjustment" (Vol. 1, p.40). Arguably also the finding by
these authors and Barry Eichengreen that commercial banks largely
ignored the repayment history ofdebtors is because banks were con-
tident to share at least possible losses with the public.
Increased multilaterallending to problem debtors in recent years
has in fact transferred private credit risks to the public sector "by
having the Bretton Woods institutions pull in as the panic-stricken
private banks have been pullingout" [Islam, 1990, p. 17]. Interestingly
enough, Eichengreen in his paper on "The D.S. Capital Market and
Foreign Lending, 1920-1955" finds a dramatic decline in private
lending and a similarly strong increase in public sector lending be-
tween the two postwar decades as weIl. Presently, commercial banks
are strongly engaged in politicallobbying on publicly subsidized exit
options as weIl as official guarantees and cofinancing of new loans.
Thewait-and-see attitude oflendersmay be overcome, however, ifthe
rules of the game were clarified and the socialization of losses and
risks unambiguously rejected. A similar reasoning may apply to
debtor governments which bargain on publicly sponsored debt relief,
thereby supporting those interest groups resisting immediate policy
reform. The internal power balance may shift towards interest groups
supporting policy reforrns as soon as debtor governments have to
realize that postponing adjustment is no promising alternative.
The way political processes and institutions influence developing
country stabilization and adjustment efforts is examined by Stephan
Haggard and Robert Kau/man. The size of debtor countries, their
political significance for creditor security calculations, and access to
nonconditional resources are considered as determinants ofintema-Nunnenkamp: Developing Country Debt 797
tional bargainingpositions and outcomes. Moreinterestingly, govern-
ment bargainingwith domestic actors overhow to allocate adjustment
burdens on the horne front is analysed. It is convincingly shown that
none of the major sectors, i.e., business, labour, and agriculture,
represent undifferentiated sets of interests. Three institutional vari-
ables are considered that may determine which interests matter polit-
ically: the type ofregime, political-electoral cycles, and the strength of
the administrative apparatus. The lack of a systematic association
between either democracy or dictatorship and the ability to adjust
leads the authors to apply finer distinctions. In contrast to "plebisci-
tary" democracies, "consultative" democracies provide "opportuni-
ties for persuasion, obtaining feedback and negotiating compensating
agreements" (Vol. 1, p. 235), thereby improving the chances for sus-
tainable adjustment. Strong authoritarian states are likely to do sig-
nificantly better than weak ones. Especially for many poordeveloping
countries, the main problem is the "lack ofpolitical institutions capa-
ble of channeling and containing demands and weak administrative
capacity" (Vol. 1, pp. 238f.). Therefore, it seems that too much focus
has been placed in the past on discrete policy reforms, and notenough
on promoting institution building and administrative human-capital
development. If policy reform programs are likely to raise expecta-
tions and fail, it mayindeed be superior to have no program at alle But
the question remains open whether the economic crisis of the 1980s
will lead to arearrangement ofbasic coalitional patterns in problem
debtor countries that improves the chances for successful adjustment.
Creditorcountries may help reform-minded interest groups within
the debtor countries to gain political influence by performing policies
that add to the benefits of internal adjustment. Rudiger Dornbusch
shows international interest rates, commodity prices and industrial
countries' growth to be crucially important in improving the external
conditions for a solution ofdebt problems. Recent forecasts on these
variables provide a mixed blessing at best [e.g., IMF, 1989]. Though
the decline in developed countries' GNP growth is expected to remain
modest, the 1988 improvement in non-fuel primary commodity prices
was not sustained, and real interest rates are unlikely to decline in the
near future. Unless comprehensive trade liberalization is initiated by
the creditor countries, the world macroeconomic environment is un-
likely to provide a setting in which debtor countries can grow out of
their debts by export booms and improving terms of trade.
Consequently, the various proposals for resolving the interna-
tional debt crisis, reviewed by Stanley Fischer, will remain on the798 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
agenda. This refers to the question ofdebt reliefin the first place. The
two NBERvolumes provide importantinsights as far as the diagnosis
and therapy oftheproblems involved are concerned, butsome sugges-
tions remain controversial. Most notably, both debtor countries and
private creditors have little interest in revealing the dimensions of
whatever compromises they might ultimately be willing to make un-
less systemic uncertainty and the still prevailing confusion about the
rules ofthe game are resolved.
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